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The Corporate Governance 
of Banks
1. Introduction
ew public policy issues have moved from the wings
to center stage as quickly and decisively as corporate 
governance.1 Virtually every major industrialized country
as well as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development and the World Bank has made efforts in 
recent years to refine their views on how large industrial 
corporations should be organized and governed. Academics 
in both law and economics have also been intensely focused 
on corporate governance.2 Oddly enough, despite the general 
focus on this topic, very little attention has been paid to the 
corporate governance of banks. This is particularly strange in 
light of the fact that a significant amount of attention has 
been paid to the role that the banks themselves play in the 
governance of other sorts of firms.3 In this paper, we explain 
the role that corporate governance plays in corporate 
performance and argue that commercial banks pose unique 
corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, 
as well as for claimants on the firms’ cash flows such as 
investors and depositors.
The intellectual debate in corporate governance has focused 
on two very different issues. The first concerns whether 
corporate governance should focus exclusively on protecting 
the interests of equity claimants in the corporation, or whether 
corporate governance should instead expand its focus to deal 
with the problems of other groups, called “stakeholders” or 
nonshareholder constituencies. The second issue of impor-
tance to corporate governance scholars begins with the 
assumption that corporate governance should concern itself 
exclusively with the challenge of protecting equity claimants, 
and attempts to specify ways in which the corporation can 
better safeguard those interests.
The Anglo-American model of corporate governance differs 
from the Franco-German model of corporate governance in its 
treatment of both issues. The Anglo-American model takes the 
view that the exclusive focus of corporate governance should be 
to maximize shareholder value. To the extent that shareholder 
wealth maximization conflicts with the interests of other 
corporate constituencies, those other interests should be 
ignored, unless management is legally required to take those 
other interests into account. The Franco-German approach to 
corporate governance, by contrast, considers corporations to 
be “industrial partnerships” in which the interests of long-term 
stakeholders—particularly banks and employee groups—
should be accorded at least the same amount of respect as those 
of shareholders.4 The Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance also differs from the Franco-German model in 
its choice of preferred solutions to the core problems of 
governance. Specifically, the market for corporate control lies 
at the heart of the Anglo-American system of corporate 
governance, while the salutary role of nonshareholder 
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constituencies, particularly banks and workers, is central
to the Franco-German governance model.
At the outset, we note that it is strange that paradigms of 
corporate governance differ on the basis of national boundaries 
rather than on the basis of the indigenous characteristics of the 
firms being governed. Of course, the extent to which either the 
Anglo-American model or the Franco-German model of 
corporate governance exists as more than theoretical 
constructs is a matter of debate. There is doubt about the extent 
to which the European system really protects the interests of 
nonshareholder constituencies, just as there is debate over 
whether the interests of  U.S. management are as closely aligned 
with those of shareholders as is generally claimed. However, 
differences in corporate governance systems do exist. 
Moreover, the distinctions between these two paradigms of 
corporate governance are quite useful in framing the analysis in 
this paper.
We begin with an overview of the topic of corporate 
governance and proceed to a discussion of the particular 
corporate governance problems of banks. We embrace the view 
that a corporation is best defined as a complex web or “nexus” 
of contractual relationships among the various claimants to the 
cash flows of the enterprise.5 The defining principle of 
American corporate governance is that an implicit term of the 
contract between shareholders and the firm is that the duty of 
managers and directors is to maximize firm value for 
shareholders. The legal manifestations of these contracts are 
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty that officers and 
directors owe to shareholders.
Although we support the general principle that fiduciary 
duties should be owed exclusively to shareholders, we believe 
that the scope of the duties and obligations of corporate officers 
and directors should be expanded in the special case of banks. 
Specifically, directors and officers of banks should be charged 
with a heightened duty to ensure the safety and soundness of 
these enterprises. Their duties should not run exclusively to 
shareholders. Thus, we support a hybrid approach to corporate 
governance in which most firms are governed according to the 
U.S. model, while banks are governed according to a variant of 
the Franco-German paradigm. Our variant calls for bank 
directors to expand the scope of their fiduciary duties beyond 
shareholders to include creditors. In particular, we call on bank 
directors to take solvency risk explicitly and systematically into 
account when making decisions, or else face personal liability 
for failure to do so.
2. The Nature and Purpose
of Corporate Governance
2.1 The Corporation as a Contract
The dominant model of corporate governance in law and 
economics is that the corporation is a “complex set of explicit 
and implicit contracts.” In other words, one should view the 
corporation as nothing more (or less) than a set of contractual 
arrangements among the various claimants to the products and 
earnings generated by the business. The group of claimants 
includes not only shareholders, but also creditors, employee-
managers, the local communities in which the firm operates, 
suppliers, and, of course, customers. In the case of banks, these 
claimants also include the regulators in their roles as insurers of 
deposits and lenders of last resort and in their capacity as agents 
of other claimants.
As Hart (1989, pp. 1757, 1764) observes, every business 
organization, including the corporation, “represents nothing 
more than a particular ‘standard form’ contract.” The very 
justification for having different types of business 
organizations is to permit investors, entrepreneurs, and other 
participants in the corporate enterprise to select the 
organizational design they prefer from a menu of standard-
form contracts. The virtue of the standard-form arrangement 
characteristic of modern corporate law is that it reduces 
transaction costs by allowing the participants in the corporate 
enterprise to take advantage of an arrangement that suits the 
needs of investors and entrepreneurs in a wide variety of 
situations.
The nexus-of-contracts approach implies that no particular 
set of contractual outcomes is ideal for every firm. Because 
contracts define each participant’s rights, benefits, duties, and 
obligations in the corporate endeavor, there is no necessary 
presumption that any one class of claimants has preference 
over any other. Instead, each claimant or group of claimants 
deserves to receive only the exact benefits of the particular 
bargain that it has struck with the firm, no more and no less. 
What claimants have bargained for, however, may differ 
enormously from firm to firm, depending on a complex set
of exigencies.6 As we discuss below, the notion that no class
of claimants should have preference over another is 
fundamentally at odds with the notion that shareholders and 
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2.2 The Economic Nature and Purpose
of Fiduciary Duties
On a theoretical level, the problems of corporate governance 
result from the existence of incomplete contracts. The rules of 
corporate governance are aimed at resolving the gaps left in 
these contracts in ways consistent with maximizing the value of 
the firm. In the case of shareholders’ contingent contracts in the 
United States, these background rules are called fiduciary duties.
The economic justification for having fiduciary duties is 
straightforward: “Fiduciary duties are the mechanism invented 
by the legal system for filling in the unspecified terms of 
shareholders’ contingent [contracts].”7 The creation of a 
contract covering all possible contingencies is impossible 
between shareholders and boards of directors. Relying only on 
an incomplete contract to define the relationship between 
shareholders and directors would lead to unacceptably high 
monitoring costs on both sides. The presence of fiduciary duties 
attempts to address these contingencies. In this gap-filling role, 
fiduciary duties essentially call on directors to work hard and to 
promote the interests of shareholders above their own.
We argue that, to the extent that fiduciary duties lower 
agency costs by reducing the freedom of management to act in 
its own unconstrained self-interest, such duties will be 
especially valuable devices in the banking context because of 
the inherent difficulties in monitoring banks. Not only are 
bank balance sheets notoriously opaque, but as Furfine (2001) 
points out, “rapid developments in technology and increased 
financial sophistication have challenged the ability of 
traditional regulation and supervision to foster a safe and 
sound banking system.”
Under Delaware law, directors are charged with the 
responsibility of managing and supervising the business and 
affairs of the corporation. “In discharging this function, the 
directors owe fiduciary duties . . . to the corporation and its 
shareholders.”8 These duties include the duty of care and the 
duty of loyalty. If these duties are breached, directors may be 
held personally liable for any damages caused by the breach.
The duty of care requires that directors exercise reasonable 
care, prudence, and diligence in the management of the 
corporation. Director liability for a breach of the duty of care 
may arise in two discrete contexts. First, liability may flow from 
“ill advised or negligent” decisionmaking. Second, liability may 
be the result of failure of the board to monitor in 
“circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have 
prevented the loss.” 9 Significantly, in both classes of cases, 
directors are entitled to rely on information, reports, 
statements, and opinions prepared by the company’s officers 
and directors as well as outside consultants. However, the 
ability of directors to rely on others does not absolve them of 
their responsibility to make independent business decisions; 
directors are only “entitled to good faith, not blind, reliance” 
on experts.10
The danger inherent in the first class of cases is that directors 
may be held liable for “honest but mistaken judgment calls”11 
when their decisions are judged in hindsight. This would result 
in an unacceptable intrusion on directors’ anonymity. Courts 
have long recognized the risks associated with judging 
directors’ decisions retrospectively. The courts have responded 
by developing what is known as the Business Judgment Rule.
Under the Business Judgment Rule, courts presume that “in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted 
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interest of the company.”12 
When the Business Judgment Rule applies, the plaintiff carries 
the burden of rebutting the presumption in favor of sound 
business judgments by showing that the directors were not 
sufficiently well informed, the directors could not rationally 
believe that the decision was in the best interest of the 
shareholders, or the decision was not made in good faith.
Courts examine the process by which the decision was made 
and not the end result of the particular decision. In other 
words, “even though a decision made or a result reached is not 
that of the hypothetical ordinary prudent person, no liability 
will attach as long as the decision-making process meets the 
[appropriate] standard.”13 The “business judgment” of a 
majority of the directors “will not be disturbed if they can be 
attributed to any rational business purpose”14 and absent 
fraud, illegality, or a conflict of interest. Accordingly, the 
Business Judgment Rule substantially reduces the risk that 
directors will be held liable for simple mistakes of judgment.
Along with adopting the Business Judgment Rule, many 
states have rejected the simple negligence standard of care. For 
example, provided that the decision was made in good faith, 
Delaware courts do not allow plaintiffs to recover unless they 
can show that a director acted with gross negligence. In this 
context, “gross negligence would appear to mean, ‘reckless 
indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the stockholders,’15 
or actions which are ‘without the bounds of reason.’16 These 
articulations arguably provide a higher threshold for liability 
than does the definition of gross negligence in general tort law.”
The second context in which directors can find themselves 
liable for breach of the duty of care involves “circumstances in 
which a loss eventuates not from a decision but, from 
unconsidered inaction.” In other words, the duty of care not 
only requires directors to make careful decisions, it also 
requires them to take affirmative steps toward monitoring the 
operations of the firm.17 In In re Caremark International Inc. 
Derivative Litigation, a Delaware court considered a claim 
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directors’ duty to monitor the ongoing operations of the firm’s 
business and performance. The original complaint in 
Caremark alleged in part “that Caremark’s directors breached 
their duty of care by failing adequately to supervise the conduct 
of Caremark employees, or institute corrective measures, 
thereby exposing Caremark to fines and liability.”
The court first noted that “absent grounds to suspect 
deception, neither corporate boards nor senior officers can be 
charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of 
employees and the honesty of their dealings on the company’s 
behalf.” The court went on to reason that it is an “elementary 
fact that relevant and timely information is an essential 
predicate for satisfaction of the board’s supervisory and 
monitoring role” of the Delaware law. Thus, the court held that 
the duty of care imposes an ongoing responsibility on directors 
to monitor a firm’s compliance with the law as well as its 
business performance. Specifically, corporate boards must 
implement and maintain information and reporting systems 
reasonably designed to provide timely and accurate 
information to allow the board to reach informed decisions.
Interestingly, the level of detail required for an information 
and reporting system is a matter of business judgment, and so 
the Business Judgment Rule protects directors’ decisions 
regarding the specific design and implementation of a firm’s 
information and reporting system. The court also recognized 
that no system completely eliminates the possibility of 
wrongdoing or violations of the law. Directors are simply 
required to exercise a good-faith judgment in deciding what sort 
of oversight is appropriate for their firm. Thus, “only a sustained 
or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as 
an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information 
and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good 
faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”
A board of directors also owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to 
the corporation and its shareholders. The Delaware Supreme 
Court has characterized the duty of loyalty as “the rule that 
requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation 
demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-
interest.” 18 Until the last part of the nineteenth century, the 
“undivided and unselfish loyalty” mandated by the duty of 
loyalty meant that, upon the insistence of the shareholders or 
the corporation, any business transaction involving a director 
and the corporation was automatically voidable, regardless of 
the fairness of the transaction. Today, however, this is no 
longer the case.
In recognition of the fact that self-interested transactions 
between board members and a corporation are often advan-
tageous to the corporation and its shareholders, courts 
generally allow for such transactions under limited 
circumstances. For instance, in Delaware, the common law 
requires the application of an intrinsic fairness test. In 
Marciano v Nakash, the court held that an interested director 
transaction must be upheld when the transaction is intrin-
sically fair. This test takes into account the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders as well as the motives of the 
director for entering into the transaction.
Prior to this paper, no attempt has been made to determine 
whether this solution applies with equal force to all sorts of 
firms. We argue that the case for making shareholders the 
exclusive beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties is 
particularly weak in the context of banks.
2.3 To Whom Should Fiduciary Duties
Be Owed?
The standard law and economics view regarding fiduciary 
duties is that corporations and their directors owe fiduciary 
duties to shareholders and to shareholders alone. There has 
been much debate over the issue of whether shareholders 
should be the exclusive beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary 
duties. The dominant view in the United States is that needless 
complexity would result if corporations were required to serve 
the interests of groups other than shareholders. Specifically, 
corporate practitioners point out that if directors must serve 
constituencies other than shareholders:
The confusion of . . . trying to . . . require directors to 
balance the interests of various constituencies without 
according primacy to shareholder interests would be 
profoundly troubling. Even under existing law, 
particularly where directors must act quickly, it is often 
difficult for directors acting in good faith to divine what is 
in the best interests of shareholders and the corporation. 
If directors are required to consider other interests as well, 
the decision-making process will become a balancing act 
or search for compromise. When directors must not only 
decide what their duty of loyalty mandates, but also to 
whom their duty of loyalty runs (and in what 
proportions), poorer decisions can be expected.19
Academics who approach this issue from a law and eco-
nomics perspective reach the same result as the corporate bar. 
As Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) observe:
As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group 
with the appropriate incentives . . . to make discretionary 
decisions. The firm should invest in new products, plants, 
etc., until the gains and costs are identical at the margin. 
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appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims on the 
income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in 
increased security) from the undertaking of a new project. 
The shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and 
incur most of the marginal costs. They therefore have the 
right incentives to exercise discretion.
Accordingly, the Anglo-American model takes the view that 
the exclusive focus of corporate governance should be to 
maximize shareholder value.
There is a conflict between the argument that shareholders 
are the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties and the idea 
that a corporation is merely a nexus of contracts, with no set of 
claimants having any a priori rights in relation to any other. 
After all, if a corporation is simply a complex web of contracts, 
the various participants to the corporate venture should be able 
to contract among themselves to obligate the directors to serve 
broad societal interests, the interests of the firm’s workers, or 
the interests of any other nonshareholder constituency. By 
contrast, fiduciary duties do not appear to be subject to 
negotiation. There is a single one-size-fits-all solution: the 
parties should write the corporate contract such that the 
shareholders always win. Accordingly, one cannot consistently 
claim that the corporation is defined by the contractual 
relationships that exist among shareholders, employees, 
managers, suppliers, customers, creditors, and others, while 
simultaneously arguing that these contractual provisions
must always subordinate the claims of nonshareholder 
constituencies to the claims of the shareholders because 
shareholders are the exclusive beneficiaries of nonwaivable 
fiduciary duties.
There are many situations in which nonshareholder 
constituencies such as uninsured depositors in banks might 
value a particular contractual right or protection more than 
shareholders value it. One obvious example is when the social 
costs of an outcome exceed the private costs of an outcome. This 
negative-externality problem is particularly relevant for 
banking because an individual bank failure can affect the 
operation of the entire banking system. Similarly, in the banking 
context, depositors’ savings (or strong governmental interests) 
are at stake. In effect, there is a public interest dimension to the 
banking firm that vitiates the exclusive claims that its 
shareholders typically bring to the attention of directors.
In practice, corporate contracts often subordinate the 
claims of shareholders to those of nonshareholder constit-
uencies. Banks, bondholders, and other fixed claimants 
commonly negotiate contractual protections for themselves to 
curb the ability of shareholders to access the cash flows of the 
corporation. Corporations in search of capital routinely agree 
to restrict their ability to make investments, loans, or other 
extensions of credit as a condition of receiving funds from 
lenders. Consequently, despite the appearance of intractability, 
fiduciary duties are simply another default rule that operates in 
the shadow of express contractual agreements and that share-
holders and nonshareholder constituencies can customize as 
they please.
Thus, the way to reconcile the tension between the idea that 
fiduciary duties are exclusive and nonwaivable and the idea 
that the corporation is a nexus of contracts is to recognize that 
shareholders can, in fact, waive fiduciary duties by ex-ante 
agreement. Parties can make deals ex ante to change the default 
terms described by fiduciary duties. Corporate law establishes 
procedural rules to assure that the ex-ante agreement meets 
standard contractual prerequisites, such as requiring relative 
parity of bargaining power and forbidding fraud in the 
inducement. Beyond that, parties are free to make deals that 
carve into the fiduciary rights of shareholders. Shareholders 
can modify the terms of fiduciary duties both by crafting 
particularized definitions of fiduciary duties and by expressly 
providing that officers and directors can engage in certain 
actions, even if such actions clearly would breach the fiduciary 
duties in the absence of such an agreement.
Because shareholders are residual claimants, the fiduciary 
duties owed to shareholders are themselves nothing other than 
a special form of residual claim. Critically, in this context, the 
residual does not mean residual cash flows. Instead, the 
concept of the residual claim captures the idea of residual legal 
rights. Just as the standard default terms of corporate law 
provide that shareholders are entitled to the firm’s residual 
cash flows after the financial claims of fixed claimants have 
been satisfied, so too are shareholders entitled to the residual 
legal rights that remain after the nonshareholder constit-
uencies’ agreements with the corporation are satisfied.
2.4 Separation of Ownership and Control
The problem of corporate governance is rooted in the Berle-
Means (1932) paradigm of the separation of shareholders’ 
ownership and management’s control in the modern 
corporation. Agency problems occur when the principal 
(shareholders) lacks the necessary power or information to 
monitor and control the agent (managers) and when the 
compensation of the principal and the agent is not aligned. 
Several factors work to reduce these principal-agency costs. 
The “market for managers” penalizes management teams that 
try to advance their own interest at shareholders’ expense.20 
Shareholders also can mitigate manager conflicts by creating 
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course, competition in product markets and capital markets 
constrains managers. Most importantly, the market for 
corporate control aligns managers’ incentives with those of 
shareholders by displacing inept or inefficient management 
through hostile takeovers.
One possible solution to the agency cost problem is to give 
shareholders direct control over management. This is the case 
when management and shareholders are the same party and 
control rights automatically rest in the hands of shareholders. 
However, some specific problems arise when shareholders seek 
to exercise control. When shareholders are widely dispersed, 
free-rider problems prevent shareholders from exerting 
meaningful constraints on management. Problems also arise 
when large shareholders participate in management. Large 
shareholders may face conflicts of interest that undermine their 
incentives to maximize firm value. For example, they may 
enjoy private benefits of control that distort their decision-
making. Alternatively, large shareholders may themselves be 
part of organizations that face governance problems, such as 
(public) pension funds.
Although these are potentially powerful concerns about the 
effectiveness of shareholder control, recent research suggests 
that more fundamental trade-offs may guide the desired 
involvement of shareholders in corporate control. Burkhart, 
Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), for example, show that direct 
shareholder control may discourage new initiatives on the part 
of managers.
These observations are consistent with real-world corporate 
governance arrangements, which almost without exception 
limit direct shareholder involvement. In some cases—
particularly in the United States—this is facilitated by relatively 
dispersed ownership. This limits direct shareholder 
involvement to at most periodic interference via proxy fights, 
hostile takeovers, or other mechanisms that seek to mobilize 
shareholders. In the Continental European context, 
concentrated ownership is the norm. However, such centralized 
ownership does not readily translate into greater shareholder 
control. In some countries (Germany and southern Europe) 
cross-holdings and pyramid structures shield firms from 
shareholders. Also, nonexecutive directors (or supervisory 
boards in a two-tier system) may shield management from 
direct shareholder involvement. In countries like the 
Netherlands—and, to a lesser extent, Germany—rather 
autonomous supervisory boards operate semi-independently 
from shareholders and effectively shield management from 
direct shareholder involvement (see Allen and Gale [2000]
for a discussion of alternative governance structures).
Banks are organized in a variety of ways, from stand-alone 
corporate entities and single bank holding companies to 
multiple bank holding companies and the post–Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) diversified holding company. To the 
extent that some of the largest U.S. banks, like Citibank and 
Bank of America, are wholly owned subsidiaries of holding 
companies, these banks will not resemble the prototypical U.S. 
corporation in which ownership is divorced from control along 
the lines described by Berle and Means. For regulatory reasons, 
holding companies that include banks within their structures 
typically operate their nonbanking business lines, such as stock 
brokerage and insurance, through nonbank subsidiaries. Thus, 
holding companies that contain banks also can contain a 
portfolio of other firms.
This diversified structure permits such holding companies 
to reduce or eliminate the firm-specific risks associated with 
the banks they own. The GLBA significantly enhanced this 
diversification ability by permitting bank holding companies 
and certain other restricted firms to become a new entity: a 
financial holding company (FHC). FHCs may engage in any 
activity that is financial in nature, incidental to a financial 
activity or complementary to a financial activity. Thus, for the 
first time, securities trading, underwriting, insurance, and 
traditional banking activities can be conducted within a single 
holding company. Significantly, the GLBA is much more 
liberal about the scope of activities permitted at the holding 
company level than at the bank level. In addition, the statute 
explicitly incorporates a corporate governance perspective by 
requiring that a depository institution be “well managed” as a 
condition for engaging in expanded activities.
This dispersion of activity throughout the holding company 
structure also gives incentives to bank holding companies to 
put more risky behavior in their federally insured banks. To 
combat this problem, the Federal Reserve developed and 
applied a regulatory doctrine to require bank holding 
companies to provide financial strength to their bank 
subsidiaries.22 The “source-of-strength” doctrine requires that 
bank holding companies maintain (and use) enough financial 
resources to aid their bank subsidiaries in case they experience 
financial difficulties. This doctrine reflects recognition of the 
fact that bank creditors need protection beyond what is 
provided by commercial law. The Supreme Court of the United 
States embraced the theory behind the source-of-strength 
doctrine in Board of Governors v First Lincolnwood 
Corporation.23 A subsequent lower court decision called into 
question the statutory power of the Federal Reserve to issue the 
source-of-strength regulation.24 However, regulators have 
continued to increase bank holding companies’ financial 
obligations to their bank subsidiaries.
The holding company structure, with its concentration of 
ownership oversight, does have the potential to provide a 
greater ability to monitor the actions of the bank. Such board 
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increasing cross-border activity and greater intricacy of 
financial products have greatly increased the complexity of 
financial institutions. Recent regulatory reforms in the GLBA 
have also increased the need for board monitoring. The GLBA 
explicitly places greater reliance on corporate governance 
mechanisms to oversee the actions of the financial enterprise.
3. Special Problems of Banks
The discussion so far has focused on a general overview of 
corporate governance. We now turn to the specific problems of 
banks and attempt to address why the scope of the duties and 
obligations of corporate officers and directors should be 
expanded in the case of banks. Our argument is that the special 
corporate governance problems of banks weaken the case for 
making shareholders the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary 
duties. Our focus here is on establishing why banks are not like 
other firms and thus why they should be treated differently.
3.1 The Liquidity Production Role of Banks
Many different types of firms extend credit. Similarly, a variety 
of nonbank firms, most notably money market mutual funds 
and nonbank credit card companies, offer the equivalent of a 
check transaction account. What distinguishes banks from 
other firms is their capital structure, which is unique in two 
ways. First, banks tend to have very little equity relative to other 
firms. Although it is not uncommon for typical manufacturing 
firms to finance themselves with more equity than debt, banks 
typically receive 90 percent or more of their funding from debt.
Second, banks’ liabilities are largely in the form of 
deposits, which are available to their creditors/depositors on 
demand, while their assets often take the form of loans that 
have longer maturities (although increasingly refined sec-
ondary markets have mitigated to some extent the mismatch 
in the term structure of banks’ assets and liabilities). Thus, the 
principal attribute that makes banks as financial inter-
mediaries “special” is their liquidity production function. By 
holding illiquid assets and issuing liquid liabilities, banks 
create liquidity for the economy.25
The liquidity production function may cause a collective-
action problem among depositors because banks keep only a 
fraction of deposits on reserve at any one time. Depositors 
cannot obtain repayment of their deposits simultaneously 
because the bank will not have sufficient funds on hand to 
satisfy all depositors at once. This mismatch between deposits 
and liabilities becomes a problem in the unusual situation of a 
bank run. Bank runs are essentially a collective-action problem 
among depositors. If, for any reason, large, unanticipated 
withdrawals do begin at a bank, depositors as individuals may 
rationally conclude that they must do the same to avoid being 
left with nothing. Thus, in a classic prisoner’s dilemma, 
depositors may collectively be better off if they refrain from 
withdrawing their money, but their inability to coordinate 
their response to the problem can lead to a seemingly irrational 
response—depositors rush to be among the first to withdraw 
their funds so that they can obtain their money before the 
bank’s cash reserves are drained.
Critical to this analysis is the fact that failures can occur even 
in solvent banks. Thus, one argument used to justify special 
regulatory treatment of banks is that the collective-action 
problem among bank depositors can cause the failure of a 
solvent bank. Deposit insurance is often justified on the grounds 
that it solves this problem by eliminating the incentive for any 
single depositor to rush to demand repayment of his deposits.
3.2 The Deposit Insurance Fund
In the wake of the mass failure of depository institutions, 
Congress passed the Banking Act of 1933, establishing the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and giving the 
federal government the power to insure deposits in qualified 
banks. The creation of federal deposit insurance has been 
tremendously effective in preventing bank runs and keeping 
the failure of individual banks from affecting the larger 
economy. Deposit insurance “has succeeded in achieving what 
had been a major objective of banking reform for at least a 
century, namely the prevention of banking panics.”26
Despite the positive effect of FDIC insurance on preventing 
bank runs, the implementation of deposit insurance poses a 
regulatory cost of its own—it gives the shareholders and 
managers of insured banks incentives to engage in excessive risk-
taking. This moral hazard occurs for two reasons. First, bank 
shareholders are able to foist some of their losses onto innocent 
third parties. These third parties are the healthy banks whose 
contributions to the FDIC pay off depositors of failed banks, and 
ultimately the federal taxpayers whose funds replenish the 
federal insurance funds when they are depleted. Second, moral 
hazard is also present because “deposit insurance premiums 
have been unrelated to, or have not fully compensated the 
FDIC for increased risk posed by a particular bank.”27
The problem of moral hazard is exacerbated in situations 
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shareholders have a strong incentive to increase risk because 
they can allocate their losses to third parties while still receiving 
any gains that might result from the risky behavior. Companies 
outside the banking industry that are close to insolvency also 
have an incentive to take added risks. However, their ability to 
do so is limited by normal market forces and contractual 
obligations. Nonfinancial firms that are in financial distress 
usually have significant liquidity problems. Nearly insolvent 
banks, however, can continue to attract liquidity in the form of 
(government-insured) deposits. Federal insurance eliminates 
the market forces that starve nonfinancial firms of cash. The 
federal government has attempted to replace these market forces 
with regulatory requirements such as capital requirements. 
Higher capital requirements force shareholders to put more of 
their money at risk, and this reduces moral hazard. In the context 
of our previous discussion of contracts, capital requirements 
allow one set of claimants—the regulators (or deposit 
insurers)—to impose restrictions on the shareholders.
3.3 The Conflict between Fixed Claimants
and Shareholders
A conflict between the interests of debtholders and the interests 
of shareholders exists in every firm. Among any particular set 
of asset allocation decisions, any investment strategy that 
increases risk will transfer wealth from the fixed claimants
to the residual claimants. This problem is raised to a new 
dimension in the banking context because of the high debt-
to-equity ratio and the existence of deposit insurance.
In the publicly held corporation, the problem of excessive 
risk-taking is mitigated by two factors. First, various devices 
serve to protect fixed claimants against excessive risk-taking. 
Corporate lenders typically insist on protection against actions 
by corporate managers that threaten their fixed claims. Second, 
risk-taking is reduced to some extent because managers are not 
perfect agents of risk-preferring shareholders. Managers are 
fixed claimants to that portion of their compensation 
designated as salary. In addition, managerial incentives for 
risk-taking are reduced, since managers have invested their 
nondiversifiable human capital in their jobs. This capital would 
depreciate significantly in value if their firms were to fail.
The second risk-reducing factor—the fact that managers 
tend to be more risk-averse than shareholders—is present for 
commercial banks as well as other corporations. What makes 
banks fundamentally different from other types of firms, 
however, is the lack of significant discipline of other fixed 
claimants. FDIC insurance removes any incentive that insured 
depositors have to control excessive risk-taking because their 
funds are protected regardless of the outcomes of the 
investment strategies that the banks select. In a world without 
deposit insurance, depositors would demand that banks refrain 
from engaging in risky investment strategies or else demand 
that they be compensated in the form of a higher interest rate 
for the extra risk. Thus, depositors of insured financial 
institutions cannot be expected to exert the same degree of 
restraint on excessive risk-taking as other fixed claimants, and 
this enhances the degree of influence exerted by shareholders, 
whose preference is to assume high levels of risk. The adverse 
incentive for risk-taking caused by federal insurance is one 
reason to have stricter accountability requirements for 
directors of banks.
3.4 Asset Structure and Loyalty Problems
The presence of a federal insurance fund also increases the risk 
of fraud and self-dealing in the banking industry by reducing 
incentives for monitoring. In the 1980s, it was estimated that 
fraud and self-dealing transactions were “apparent” in as many 
as one-third of today’s bank failures.28 A similar statistic shows 
that between 1990 and 1991, insider lending contributed to 175 
of 286 bank failures.29 Such behavior, of course, is a possibility 
in any large firm, since it is inefficient for owners to monitor all 
employees at all times. These sorts of problems are particularly 
acute in financial institutions, however, because of the large 
portion of their assets held in highly liquid form.
The same regulatory structure that creates a problem of 
excessive risk-taking by banks also leads to a reduction in the 
normal levels of monitoring within the firm, resulting in a 
higher incidence of bank failures due to fraud. Not only does 
the protection afforded by the FDIC remove any incentive for 
insured depositors to control excessive risk-taking, it also 
removes their incentive to monitor in order to reduce the 
incidence of fraud and self-dealing.
Shareholders have an incentive to monitor to prevent fraud 
and self-dealing in banks, but such monitoring is notoriously 
ineffective in many cases because individual shareholders 
rarely have sufficient incentives to engage in monitoring 
because of collective-action problems. Outside the banking 
setting, fraud and self-dealing are monitored by fixed claimants 
and preferred shareholders through contractual devices and by 
lenders through regular oversight of their borrowers’ affairs.
One might argue that FDIC insurance simply replaces one set 
of creditors: depositors, with another set of creditors: state and 
federal regulators. These other creditors might appear more 
financially sophisticated than rank-and-file depositors and thus 
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to prevent bank fraud. The fact that both federal and state 
regulators require periodic reports from banks and conduct
on-site inspections of bank premises supports this contention.
In addition to regulators’ power to monitor banks through 
reports and examinations, upon the discovery of a fraudulent 
banking practice—or indeed a practice that regulators deem to 
be “unsafe or unsound”—the appropriate federal banking 
agency may order the activity terminated. Courts have 
determined that the term “unsafe banking practice” may be 
liberally construed to give the relevant bank regulator 
discretion to correct perceived problems in their infancy. 
Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act, regulatory agencies were required to issue 
guidelines or regulations creating standards for safety and 
soundness in the following areas: 1) internal controls, 
information systems, and internal audit systems, 2) loan 
documentation, 3) credit underwriting, 4) interest rate 
exposure, 5) asset growth, 6) compensation, fees, and benefits, 
and 7) asset quality, earnings, and stock valuation.30
Regulators have five main enforcement tools: cease and 
desist powers, removal powers, civil money penalty powers, 
withdrawal or suspension of federal deposit insurance powers, 
and prompt corrective-action powers. Cease and desist powers 
generally address both unsafe and unsound banking as well as 
violations of the law or regulations governing depository 
institutions. These powers allow regulators to issue injunctions 
as well as to take corrective actions against banks. Bank 
regulators also may remove officers and directors from their 
posts, or ban them from ever working for a depository 
institution in the United States, if they can show that the 
individual acted unlawfully, received a personal benefit, or 
acted in a manner detrimental to the bank or its depositors.
Federal banking agencies also have the power to impose civil 
monetary penalties against a banking institution and its affiliates. 
Prompt corrective-action powers are also triggered by capital 
requirements, and these allow regulators to reach every 
significant operational aspect of a bank. Finally, the FDIC has the 
authority to revoke a bank’s depositor insurance if necessary. 
Thus, the problem with the current system—which substitutes 
government regulators for private-sector creditors as the 
primary monitors of bank activity—is not that the regulators 
lack the administrative authority to do an effective job.
Nevertheless, replacing private-sector creditors with public-
sector regulators as the first line of defense against bank fraud 
and self-dealing presents two problems.31 Private-sector 
creditors have stronger incentives than public-sector regulators 
to monitor closely for fraud and self-dealing. Because the 
creditors’ own money is on the line, they will monitor until the 
losses avoided from such monitoring equal the marginal cost of 
such activity. In addition, if a competitive market for bank 
services exists, those bankers that can develop mechanisms for 
providing depositors and creditors with credible assurances 
that they will refrain from fraudulent activities will thrive
at the expense of their competitors.
4. Bank Corporate Governance:
What Standard to Apply?
Our analysis thus far has reviewed the various paradigms of 
corporate governance and analyzed the special features of 
banks as corporations. We now turn to our central issue: the 
nature of bank corporate governance. Previously, we observed 
that all directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
shareholders, and that these duties include the duty of care and 
the duty of loyalty. We have also argued that the particular 
nature of banking makes it susceptible to greater moral hazard 
problems than a typical firm is. In this section, we maintain 
that the special nature of banking dictates that the duty of care 
owed by bank directors is more extensive than that of other 
directors. The courts have vacillated in their interpretations of 
this duty, resulting in confusion over the appropriate standard 
to apply.
The duty of care has a long and controversial history in 
banking. The first case to articulate the modern “tort-based 
duty of care for bank directors” was Briggs v Spaulding. 32
In Briggs, the president of the First National Bank of Buffalo 
caused the bank to become insolvent by making illegal and 
unsound loans to himself, members of his family, and third 
parties with little or no financial credibility. The bank’s 
directors “gave no attention whatever to the management of 
the bank’s business,” but instead relied on the president to 
conduct and manage the affairs of the bank. The bank’s 
receiver ultimately sued several of the bank’s officers and 
directors, alleging that the bank had suffered losses as a result 
of “the misconduct of the officers and directors” and their 
failure “to perform faithfully and diligently the duties of their 
office.” In determining the standard of care required of 
banking directors, the court held that, “directors must exercise 
ordinary care and prudence in the administration of the affairs 
of a bank,” which requires “something more than officiating as 
figure-heads.” Thus, by requiring that directors of depository 
institutions exercise “ordinary care” in conducting the affairs 
of a bank, Briggs established “a federal common law standard of 
simple negligence for directors of federally chartered and 
federally insured depository institutions.”
In setting this standard of care, however, the Briggs Court 
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too high: “One must be very careful . . . not to press so hard on 
honest directors as to make them liable for these constructive 
defaults, the only effect of which would be to deter all men of 
any property, and perhaps all men who have any character to 
lose, from becoming directors of companies at all.”33
From Briggs, the history of banking directors’ duty-of-care 
cases follows a cyclical pattern. During or immediately fol-
lowing a period of high bank failure, courts have traditionally 
raised the standard of care required of bank directors and 
curtailed the effects of the Business Judgment Rule. The courts, 
during such a period, have turned away from the traditional 
formulation of the Business Judgment Rule, which looks only 
at the decision-making process, and instead have looked at the 
substance of the decision and its end result. For example, in the 
wake of the Great Depression, the failure of thousands of 
banks, and the advent of federal deposit insurance, bank 
directors were held to a higher standard than nonbank 
directors.
Interestingly, the courts’ justification for holding directors 
to a higher standard was grounded in the fact that bank 
shareholders needed protection from the increased risks of 
personal liability caused by statutory and contractual 
arrangements prevalent during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. These arrangements imposed greater liability on 
shareholders of banks than shareholders of other corporations, 
whose risk of loss did not extend beyond the amount of their 
original capital contribution.
New Hampshire and Pennsylvania imposed joint and 
several liability on bank shareholders early in the nineteenth 
century. The laws of other states imposed double liability on all 
corporate shareholders. These rules required shareholders to 
pay up to the amount of their original investment into the 
estate of the insolvent bank. During the 1840s and 1850s, some 
southern state legislatures made the granting of special banking 
charters subject to a requirement that the shareholders would 
be liable for their pro-rata share of the bank’s debts in case of 
insolvency. Some banks established double shareholder 
liability by means of charter provisions. A number of states, 
including New York, Kansas, Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota, 
adopted double liability rules in their constitutions.
Congress drew on these state provisions when, in the 
National Banking Act of 1863, it established a system of 
national banks and provided that “each shareholder shall be 
liable to the amount of the par value of the shares held by him, 
in addition to the amount invested in such shares.”34 Senator 
Sherman, who proposed the provision, explained that it 
tracked the laws of “most of the States of the Union”35 and that 
the goal was to give bank creditors “something more than the 
stock to fall back upon.” Looking back on the statute the 
following year, Sherman explained that in addition to providing 
security for creditors, the double liability provision “tends to 
prevent the stockholders and directors of a bank from engaging 
in hazardous operations.”36 A revision of 1864 added that the 
shareholders would be liable “equally and ratably, and not one 
for the other.” This meant that no shareholder could be assessed 
for more than his or her pro-rata share, even if other share-
holders were insolvent or beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
Following the implementation of the federal double liability 
system, states continued to adopt similar programs for their 
state-chartered banks; by 1931, almost all states had 
implemented double liability rules for bank shareholders. 
California’s law made no mention of any limit of liability to par 
value, and Colorado imposed triple liability.
The wave of bank failures that occurred between 1929 and 
1933 placed heavy strains on the double liability system and 
ultimately precipitated its downfall. Shareholders were assessed 
in large numbers at a time when many were already in serious 
financial difficulty. Meanwhile, the dispersal of bank shares 
among the public, which had progressed rapidly during the 
economic boom of 1923-29, meant that many of the 
shareholders being assessed had no insider connection to the 
failed bank, either by way of family relationships or 
employment status. Many had purchased their shares in 
prosperous times without serious consideration of their 
potential liability in the event of bank failure. Enforcing 
schemes of nonlimited liability also reduced the liquidity of 
secondary markets in bank stock by requiring shareholders to 
engage in costly cross-monitoring.
These factors resulted in political pressure during the 1930s to 
repeal double liability or blunt its force. Following—or perhaps 
inciting—the public dismay, the consensus of scholarly opinion 
as reflected in the law journals turned sharply against double 
liability after 1929. As one author noted in 1936, the double 
liability “effectively bankrupts many innocent stockholders who 
have taken no part in the active management and control of the 
bank.”37 By 1944, the tide had turned so far against double 
liability that the Supreme Court was roundly lambasted in much 
of the popular press for upholding an assessment of shareholders 
of a holding company for the liabilities of a failed subsidiary 
bank—a result that would almost certainly have received 
widespread acclaim twenty years earlier.38
Bolstering the objection to double liability was the wide-
spread perception that double liability failed to fulfill its 
intended purpose.39 Notwithstanding double liability, 
thousands of banks had failed and the nation had plunged into 
an unprecedented economic catastrophe. Double liability, 
despite its venerable heritage, seemed “inadequate as a means 
of protecting the depositing public.”
The third and decisive factor contributing to the downfall
of double liability was the establishment of federal deposit FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2003 101
insurance in the Banking Act of 1933. At the time, most 
observers believed that government deposit insurance was a far 
more effective remedy for the problems of the banking system 
than the outmoded system of double liability—an evaluation 
borne out by the success of federal deposit insurance at 
stopping bank runs.
In 1933, Congress repealed double liability for newly 
issued national bank shares; and in 1935, it prospectively 
extinguished all double liability for national bank stock 
provided that a bank gave six months’ notice of termination. 
Federal double liability was all but moribund after 1934. By 
1953, all but 25 of the nearly 5,000 national banks had 
published the required notice and opted out of double 
liability. Congress eliminated the double liability of these 
few holdovers in 1953, thus bringing ninety years of double 
liability for national banks to a formal close.
State legislatures also dismantled their double liability 
systems after 1930. Iowa authorized state banks to issue 
nonassessable stock in 1933, and soon thereafter it repealed 
double liability altogether subject to a limited set of transition 
rules. Many other states did the same. By 1944, thirty-one states 
had abolished double liability. Today, double liability for bank 
shareholders is a dead letter everywhere.
Although this particular feature of increased bank corporate 
liability was dismantled, other vestiges of a higher standard for 
bank corporate liability remained. The 1940s case of Litwin v 
Allen40 illustrates the propensity of post-Depression courts to 
require a higher standard of care for bank directors than 
nonbank directors. Litwin v Allen involved a shareholder’s 
derivative action against the directors of Guaranty Trust 
Company (“Trust Company”) and its wholly owned subsidiary, 
the Guaranty Company of New York (“Guaranty Company”).
The issue in this case was whether there was a violation of 
the bank directors’ duty of care in the bank’s entry into a series 
of repurchase transactions with Alleghany Corporation. The 
court found that the duty of care is more strict for bank 
directors than for those of other companies because banks are 
charged with serving the public interest, not just the interests of 
the shareholders. Specifically, the court charged the directors 
with the care exercised by “reasonably prudent bankers.” The 
court went on to determine that “this transaction . . . was so 
improvident, so risky, so unusual and unnecessary as to be 
contrary to fundamental conceptions of prudent banking 
practices.” The court accordingly imposed personal liability on 
the bank’s board of directors.
This tightening of judicial scrutiny of banking directors’ 
duty of care has traditionally been followed by a corresponding 
judicial backlash resulting in a strict application of the Business 
Judgment Rule. For instance, following the Litwin case and 
World War II, during a time of economic prosperity, 
questionable lending practices such as “delinquent loan 
renewals, nonexistent underwriting standards, and absent 
internal controls, received protection by the courts under the 
Business Judgment Rule.”41
The tide turned back in favor of higher standards of care for 
bank directors following the massive failure of banks and 
savings and loan associations in the mid-1980s. During this 
time, more than 700 savings and loans and 300 banks failed, 
costing American taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars.42 
The FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) filed 
hundreds of lawsuits against directors and officers of these 
failed banks and savings and loans, and approximately 1,300 
people were indicted and most were convicted of a crime 
connected to the failure of a financial institution. Many of these 
cases involved allegations that the directors breached their duty 
of care by engaging in unsound lending practices. The courts 
again faced the issue of whether banking directors should be 
held to the higher standard of care articulated in the older 
banking cases. The FDIC and RTC argued in favor of this 
position, while the defendants agued that their actions should 
be evaluated under the Business Judgment Rule.
Concurrent with the federal government’s attempts to 
increase pressure on bank directors, however, many states passed 
legislation in an attempt to insulate such directors from personal 
liability. Some states adopted legislation that imposed liability 
only for willful or wanton conduct or intentional conduct. This 
had the effect of limiting the opportunity for the federal 
government to recover some of its loss due to the widespread 
failure of financial institutions. In an effort to “strengthen the 
civil sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding or otherwise 
damaging depository institutions and their depositors” and to 
“strengthen the enforcement powers of the federal regulators of 
depository institutions,” Congress created a universal standard 
of care for directors of federally insured and chartered 
depositories as part of the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).
This statute provides in part that:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution 
may be held personally liable for monetary damages in 
any civil action by, on behalf of, or at the request or 
direction of the Corporation, which action is prosecuted 
wholly or partially for the benefit of the Corporation . . . 
for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or 
conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of 
care (than gross negligence) including intentional 
tortuous conduct, as such terms are defined and 
determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this 
paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the 
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Despite Congressional intent to clarify the standard of care, 
courts were unable to agree on whether the statute established 
a national standard or whether it left room for federal common 
law and state law standards of liability. State courts had long 
established a variety of standards of care for state-created 
institutions, while federal courts had created a federal standard 
of care for directors of federally chartered banks.
Finally, in 1997, the Supreme Court settled the debate 
surrounding a federal standard of care in banking by 
overruling the early federal cases establishing a higher 
standard of care for banking directors. In Atherton v 
F.D.I.C., the Court found that there is no longer federal 
common law providing for a standard of care for directors 
of federally insured financial institutions. Next, the Court 
held that “the statute’s ‘gross negligence’ standard provides 
only a floor—a guarantee that officers and directors must 
meet at least a gross negligence standard. It does not stand 
in the way of a stricter standard that the laws of some States 
provide.” In other words, the Court found that state law 
defines the duty of directors of both state- and federally 
chartered institutions. Directors of federally chartered 
institutions must be subject to at least a gross negligence 
standard. However, states are free to set higher standards
of care for directors of banks.
5. Conclusion
What, then, are we to conclude about bank corporate 
governance? We think that a clear case can be made for bank 
directors being held to a broader, if not a higher, standard of 
care than other directors. The structure of bank balance 
sheets—particularly banks’ highly leveraged condition and 
the mismatch in the term structure and liquidity of their 
assets and liabilities—supports the argument that bank 
directors should owe fiduciary duties to fixed claimants as 
well as to equity claimants. The importance of banks to the 
stability of the financial system also speaks to a broader 
public role of banks in the payments system and to interest 
claims on banks. The existence of the federally sponsored 
deposit insurance program administered by the FDIC 
provides further support for our position. Banking 
institutions face particularly acute moral hazard problems. 
Historically, double liability for banks’ shareholders 
mitigated these problems. Government deposit insurance 
has reduced the political demand for expanded duties of 
bank directors, but the policy justification for imposing such 
duties remains.
It seems to us that the rationale for imposing broader duties 
on bank directors is clear. The more difficult question is what 
those duties should look like. The issue of directors’ duties arises 
in two contexts. The first context, epitomized by Litwin v Allen, 
is that of a discrete decision brought to the board for approval. 
Here we argue that directors of federally insured depository 
institutions should have a legal obligation to consider the impact 
of their decisions on the safety and soundness of the bank. In 
particular, we believe that directors are obliged to inform 
themselves of whether a particular decision will: 1) impair the 
ability of the financial institution to pay its debts as such debts 
come due in the ordinary course of business, 2) materially 
increase the riskiness of the bank, as measured by the variance 
in returns on the bank’s investments, or 3) materially reduce 
the bank’s capital position, as measured both by a risk-based 
calculation and by the leverage test. As with other board 
decisions, directors should be entitled to rely on expert 
opinions and reports. But such reliance must be reasonable.
In certain contexts, even U.S. directors must take the 
interests of fixed claimants into account. For example, 
directors may not make distributions to shareholders if after 
payment of the distribution “the corporation would not be able 
to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of 
business.”43 If such a distribution is made, a director may be 
held personally liable for the amount of the distribution.44 
Insolvent federally insured financial institutions, unlike other 
types of firms, seldom will be liquidity-impaired in the way we 
describe because they generally will be able to obtain cash by 
attracting new depositors. Thus, banks will often be able to pay 
their debts until they are closed by regulators. Therefore, the 
effects of board actions on a bank’s leverage, risk, and balance-
sheet solvency generally will be more important than the effects 
of board actions on liquidity. Similarly, in the bankruptcy 
context, directors must consider the interests of fixed claimants 
over those of shareholders. In banking, the need for protecting 
the interest of fixed claimants is far more profound.
The second context in which the issue of directors’ duties 
and obligations arises is that of the obligation of directors to 
provide continuous oversight of the companies on whose 
boards they serve. As noted above, under Caremark, directors 
are simply required to exercise a good-faith judgment in 
deciding what sort of oversight is appropriate for their firm. 
When a board of directors is charged with losses arising out of 
activities that the board was unaware of, “only a sustained or 
systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as 
an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information 
and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good 
faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”45
As applied to the banking industry, we believe that this 
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should be made into why the directors were unaware of the 
activity in question. Liability should attach where failure to 
maintain and construct an adequate reporting system was the 
reason for the ignorance. Moreover, we challenge the notion 
that only “sustained and systematic failure to provide 
oversight” should give rise to liability in the banking industry. 
Instead, it is our view that in order to avoid liability, directors 
of banks have a continuing obligation to develop and maintain 
a detailed and elaborate system for monitoring and oversight. 
Furthermore, bank directors should not be able to eliminate 
their personal liabilities in duty-of-care cases. Accordingly, 
state statutes giving firms the power to enact provisions in their 
corporate charters that opt out of personal liability should not 
extend to banking directors.
The expanded set of fiduciary duties that we advocate in this 
paper would push the corporate governance of U.S. banks in 
the direction of the Franco-German corporate governance 
model, which has long reflected the view that the respon-
sibilities of corporate directors extend beyond the confines of 
the shareholder population. There is some evidence that this 
alternative approach has allowed banks to avoid the pitfalls 
associated with applying the pure Anglo-American model to 
the special case of bank corporate governance (see, for 
example, Edwards and Fischer [1994] or Franks and Mayer 
[forthcoming]). More important, however, we believe that the 
Franco-German model is likely to be more successful in the 
United States than it has been on the European continent. We 
make this contention because, unlike Europe, the United States 
has a well-developed private enforcement system in which 
beneficiaries of fiduciary duties can litigate in order to 
vindicate their rights.
Implicit in our proposal is the assumption that, like 
shareholders, bank creditors (including the FDIC) should be 
able to sue bank directors for violations of the fiduciary duty of 
care and loyalty if they suffer losses due that are attributable to 
the violation of one of these fiduciary duties. In other words, 
although we advocate following the Franco-German model in 
broadening the scope of duties owed by corporate directors, we 
also advocate retaining the U.S. system under which directors 
incur genuine litigation risk if they violate their fiduciary 
duties. Increasing the standard of care for bank directors poses 
the risk of diminishing the quality of corporate governance as 
the pool of available directors shrinks to include only those 
persons who are judgment-proof. We believe that this is a 
realistic danger only when the legal standards for directors are 
unclear or when courts are unpredictable or corrupt. However, 
in our judgment, the standards we have articulated are 
sufficiently clear, and U.S. courts have sufficient competence 
and expertise to make our proposal work.
Finally, we note that the enhanced standards we advocate 
are concordant with the new financial regulatory environment 
envisioned by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. As financial 
institutions become more complex and less centralized 
organizations, the risks they pose to the financial system also 
increase. Although regulators clearly have an important 
monitoring and oversight role, the concomitant role
and responsibility of the board of directors cannot be
ignored.Endnotes
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affirmed, Gimbel v Signal Companies, Inc., Del. Supr., 316 A.2d 619 
(1974).
17. For example, in Francis v United Jersey Bank, the court held that a 
director has an affirmative obligation to “keep informed about the 
activities of the corporation” and “maintain familiarity with the 
financial status of the corporation.” 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981); 
see also In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 1996 
WL 549894 (Del. Ch. 1996).
18. Guth v Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
19. See ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, “Other Constituencies 
Statutes: Potential for Confusion,” Business Law 45 (1990, pp. 2253, 
2269).
20. The theory of a “market for managers” goes back at least to 
Alchian (1969, pp. 337, 342-51). The theory was formalized and 
extended in Fama (1980). We do not suggest, of course, that the 
“market for managers” is perfect in some idealized way, nor that it 
alone operates to monitor management. We note only that “an 
important premise of corporate finance theory is that markets 
discipline managers to maximize all stockholders’ wealth. Competi-
tive forces in two markets, the market for corporate control and the 
market for managerial labor services, are widely viewed as providing 
complementary enforcement of the stockholder wealth maximization 
rule.” See Dann and DeAngelo (1983).Endnotes (Continued)
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21. For example, the adoption of “golden parachute” agreements by 
shareholders as a means of aligning the interests of managers more 
closely with their own interests illustrates the ability of shareholders to 
react effectively to the agency cost problems described above. See 
William J. Karney, “Pols Poking Holes in Golden Parachutes,”
Wall Street Journal, April 16, 1984, p. 32. 
22. See Jackson and Symons (1999, p. 307).
23. 439 U.S. 234 (1978).
24. Mcorp Financial Inc. v Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 
1990), reversed in part on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
25. See Diamond and Dybig (1986).
26. See Friedman and Schwartz (1963,  p. 440).
27. See Hanc (1999, p. 3).
28. Remarks by R. L. Clarke, The Exchequer Club, Washington, D.C., 
in Comptroller of the Currency News Release no. NR 88-5 (January 20, 
1988, p. 6).
29. See Jackson and Symons (1999, p. 152), citing a study by the 
U.S. General Accounting Office. In 1990, the chairman of the FDIC 
claimed that approximately 60 percent of all failed savings and loan 
associations during the 1980s were the victims of “serious criminal 
activity.” 
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1.
31. See Macey and Garrett (1988, pp. 215, 225).
32. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
33. 141 U.S. 132, 149 (1891), quoting In re Forest of Dean Coal Mining 
Co., 10 L.R.-Ch. 450, 451 (Rolls Court).
34. National Banking Act of 1863, Ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
35. Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d sess. 824 (1863).
36. Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st sess. Part II 1069 (1864).
37. Statutory Liability, supra note 37, p. 620.
38. See “Note, Banks and Banking—Liability of Bank Stock Holding 
Company Shareholders,” Columbia Law Review 44, no. 30 (1944,
pp. 561, 565).
39. For congressional disenchantment, see House Committee on 
Banking and Currency, Hearings on H.R. 141, 71st Cong., 2d sess. 17 
(1930), observing that double liability had afforded “inadequate” 
protection to depositors.
40. 5 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
41. See McCoy (1996, p. 43).
42. See Weinstein (1993).
43. Model Business Corporation Act § 6.40.
44. Model Business Corporation Act  § 8.33.
45. In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,
1996 WL 549894 (Del. Ch. 1996), pp. 967-71.References
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